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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  An  economist  who  visits  the  land  of  the  Arts  and  Culture  will  certainly  be 
bewildered about all the nice and strange things that he sees there. Those economists 
that try to understand this foreign world seem to fall in two camps. On the one hand 
there are those that, by taking the economic perspective, try to make as much sense of 
this field as possible. Typically, economists belonging to this group would claim that, 
while the economic perspective does not give a perfect understanding, it certainly 
helps  in  understanding  this  area.  Of  the  speakers  in  today’s  conference,  I  would 
classify Van der Ploeg, Frey and Casson as belonging to this camp. The other group 
of  tourists  are  those  that  conclude  that  the  economic  perspective  is  at  a  loss  to 
understand what is going on in the Arts, and that economists should change their 
perspective.  With  the  present  paper,  Arjo  Klamer  posits  himself  squarely  in  this 
second  group.  He  argues  that  economists  should  approach  the  field  of  Arts  and 
Culture in a very different way. 
 
  I have not been convinced by Arjo Klamer’s arguments, and in this discussion, I 
argue why I found the arguments to be not convincing. This discussion is organised as 
follows.  In  Section  2,  I  summarize  what  I  perceive  to  be  the  essential  point  of 
Klamer’s paper. In Section 3, I argue that Klamer’s perspective of economics is one-
sided, that he focuses exclusively on the production side, while the demand side may 
be  most  relevant  for  understanding  the  world  of  culture.  In  Section  4,  I  discuss 
Klamer’s motivating examples and argue why I find these  fully  unconvincing. In 
Section  5,  I  wonder  why  Klamer convulsively  tries  to avoid  the  notion  of  utility 
throughout  his  paper,  and  I  discuss  in  somewhat  greater  detail  his  proposal  of 
recognizing,  besides  economic  capital,  also  social  and  cultural  capital.  Section  6 
concludes. My overall conclusion is that it would not be wise to follow Klamer’s 
proposal to measure the cultural values that, at present, are not yet measured. I give 
two arguments. First, since Klamer’s proposal amounts to a certain form of economic 
imperialism (he proposes to give economic notions of capital a more important role in 
the cultural domain) and since these economic concepts may be foreign to those that 
lobby for cultural values at the moment, the proposal may backfire, since requiring 
the lobbyists to  use this  language may make their lobby less  effective.  Secondly, 
instead of exporting concepts of capital, economists could also show that their basic   3
concepts are so flexible that they can incorporate insights and ideas from the world of 
the arts. Rather than exporting, we may be on the receiving end and join in the lobby. 
Of course, if trade is voluntarily, it will benefit both sides of the transaction.  
 
 
2.  KLAMER’S THEOREM 
 
  In  order  to  try  to  understand  Klamer’s  paper,  I  tried  to  extract  a  testable 
hypothesis  from  it.  While  I  am  not  sure  that  the  following  statement  is  actually 




(i)  economic thinking guides policy making, 
(ii)  only economic goals are being measured at the moment, 
(iii)  the economic goals are not ends in themselves, and 
(iv)  what is really of value (the ultimate ends) is not measured, 
  it follows that:  
(v)  policy makers pursue measurable ends, 
(vi)  the wrong policies are being followed at present, and 
(vii)  in order to realize the ultimate ends, we should measure what we really value. 
 
  The last point in this Theorem is Klamer’s proposal: at present we possess much 
more than what we account for in our balance sheets and in order not to lose track of 
these, we should develop indicators for “the good life”, for those things that we really 
value.  Before  discussing  this  proposal,  let  us  investigate  the  assumptions  and  the 
conclusions of the Theorem. 
 
  Clearly, the Theorem pictures a stylised situation. It certainly is not completely 
true that only economic indicators are being measured and that only economic goals 
are being pursued. For example, consider development. The United Nations adopts a 
development index in which not only bbp per capita, but also other indicators, such as 
life expectancy at birth, literacy rates, etc. play a role. Hence, other indicators of the 
“value of life” are being measured and, therefore, presumably also taken into account   4
in actual policy making. There is no reason to assume that this would be different in 
the field of culture. But, for the sake of argument, let us accept that assumption (iv) 
holds and that important indicators of the good life are not being measured. Should 
we then conclude that these aspects would not be taken into account when policy is 
made? Perhaps we could accept that there is a bias towards measurable indicators; 
these will be available, they cannot be easily neglected and they will always be on the 
agenda. But, non-measurable indicators can come on the agenda as well; if they are 
important, there will be lobby groups that will lobby to get them discussed, and there 
is  no  reason  to  assume  that  these  groups  will  not  be  successful.  Consequently, 
conclusions  (v)  and  (vi)  seem  too  strong  in  its  present  form;  they  assume  policy 
makers that are very boundedly rational, or perhaps even irrational. Of course, we 
know from the theory of the “multi-task principal agent problem” that, if there are 
both  measurable  and  non-measurable  goals,  and  policy  pursues  only  those  of  the 
former type, those of the latter type will suffer, but exactly since we are aware of this, 
enlightened policy making will simply not just focus on the measurable goals. 
 
  My conclusion, therefore, is that the positive part of Klamer’s Theorem has not 
been demonstrated. I concede that there may be a bias towards measurable goals, but 
we do not know how strong that bias is and further empirical study seems called for. 
What about the normative part of Klamer’s Theorem: if there indeed is a bias, how to 
correct  it?  One  possibility  indeed  is  to  come  up  with  measures  of  those  value 
indicators that are not measured at present, and this is what Klamer proposes. An 
alternative, of course, is to stress the points (iii) and (iv) of his Theorem and to keep 
these aspects on the agenda without actually measuring them. Klamer’s paper does 
not contain a discussion about this alternative, and we cannot judge at the moment 
how  it  compares.  Arguments  may,  however,  be  given  for  why  this  could  be  the 
preferred route. The measurements that Klamer proposes may be very difficult to do, 
as he admits, and, even if they are possible, they might result only in very imperfect 
proxies of those aspects that one is really interested in. Hence, policies aimed at the 
measured indicators may still not accomplish what one wants. Even more importantly, 
these indicators may be foreign to the workers in the cultural sector. If they cannot 
identify with these indicators, their lobbies may be less successful than before, hence, 
the policy outcome may be even worse. I conclude that, without further study, it is not 
clear whether following Klamer’s Proposal will lead to an improvement. Hence, those   5
that share Klamer’s discomfort with the present situation would better think twice 
before actually accepting the medicine that is recommended. 
 
  My own intuition is that it actually may be best not to follow Klamer’s proposal. 
I will argue below that rather than imposing measurement on the cultural sector, it is 
better  to  show  that  the  economic  approach  and  formalism  can  make  room  for 
arguments from that sector. 
 
 
3.  KLAMER’S MOTIVATION 
 
  The  motivation  underlying  Klamer’s  Proposal  is  that  the  standard  economic 
perspective is not helpful in understanding the world of the arts. He writes 
 
  “Ever since I began to consider the world of the arts from an economic 
perspective  I  have  been  dealing  with  the  restrictions  of  the  standard 
economic perspective. It was as if that perspective did not allow me to see 
things  particular  to  that  world.  The  standard  categories  fell  short,  or 
restrained me too much in grasping what I saw. The questions then spilled 
over to other realms of the economy to end up infecting everything that we 
economists tend to view as part of our domain.” 
 
  Note that the claim extends beyond the world of the arts, Klamer actually states 
that he doubts whether the standard economic perspective is useful at all. There are 
two issues here: what is the standard economic perspective, and what is the domain of 
economics? 
 
  In my opinion, the only meaningful answer to this last question is “the domain 
of economics is everything to which an economic scientist can make a meaningful 
contribution”. In my view, it is not so easy to identify ex ante the set of problems to 
which economists may, or may not, make useful contributions, hence, the domain of 
economics cannot be easily identified. However, it does seem to make sense to speak 
of the, or at least of an, economic approach to solve problems, hence, economics is a 
method of analysis. Consequently, it indeed makes sense to speak of an economic   6
perspective, and perhaps also of the standard economic perspective. For my purposes 
here, it suffices to identify this (standard) economic approach with that described in 
Gary  Becker’s  Nobel  Lecture  “The  economic  way  of  Looking  at  Life”  (Becker, 
1993).  While  it  is  not  so  easy  to  give  a  brief  description  of  what  that  approach 
amounts  to,  one  recognizes  it  immediately  when  one  sees  it.  As  Becker  writes 
[economic]  “analysis  assumes  that individuals  maximize  welfare  as  they  conceive 
it...their behavior is forward looking, and it is also assumed to be consistent over 
time”(Becker  (1993,  p.  386;  emphasis  in  original),  hence,  individual  preferences 
(utility functions) seem to form the core of the economic approach. In this respect, I 
find it quite remarkable how much trouble Klamer takes in trying to avoid the concept 
of the utility function, an issue to which I return in the next section. 
 
  In  his  paper,  Klamer  gives  a  somewhat  peculiar  view  on  the  economic 
perspective. In brief, he identifies economics with accounting. He writes 
 
  “Study economics and you learn to think in terms of capital and return, 
savings  and  investments,  circular  flow,  profit,  national  income  and 
national product, all of which are accounting categories.” 
 
  All of those aspects are related to the production side of the economy. But, 
economics also considers the demand side. Students of economics also learn about 
individual  preferences  and  utility  functions,  and  these  demand  side  concepts  are 
notably absent from Klamer’s paper. In my view, therefore, Klamer’s perspective is 
one-sided and distorted. Furthermore, the tools of economics were shaped by the work 
on several domains and here Klamer focuses on the business domain. He cites Hicks, 
who writes 
 
  “Economics is the science which deals with business affairs”, 
 
which clearly is a much narrower definition than what I have given above, and which 
is a much narrower domain than to which economists, following Becker, have applied 
their tools. Klamer focuses on that part of the economic tool box that was developed 
in the study of business, and, as he writes, in that study 
   7
  “economists carefully cut away, shredded, and threw away elements non-
economical. And so social, moral and psychological elements, common 
features in classical writings, got marginalized and disappeared from the 
discourse”. 
 
  While  the  statement  is  not  completely  true  even  for  the  economic  study  of 
business,  since  the  elements  that  Klamer  mentions  have  come  in  again,  see  e.g. 
Bewley (1999), it is definitely way off for those parts of economics that do not mainly 
focus  on  business  problems.  It  suffices  to  refer  here  to  the  most  recent  Annual 
Congress  of  the  European  Economic  Association,  for  which  the  President,  Jean 
Tirole,  had  chosen  “Behavioural  Economics”  as  the  unifying  main  theme.  The 
interested reader may consult the papers by Tirole, Rabin and Fehr in the Papers and 
Proceedings in the European Economic Review for overviews of the current thinking. 
Tirole  (2002)  focuses  on  the  theory  of  commitment  and  he  shows  the  value  of 
theoretical  model  building  in  this  domain.  Fehr  (2002)  discusses  his  work  on 
individuals’ social orientation, which investigates the important consequences, also in 
the  traditional  economic  domain,  of  people  not  being  completely  selfish.  To 
complement  these  perspectives  from  economics  and  sociology,  Rabin  (2002) 
discusses the need and possibilities to enrich the present theory by taking cognitive 
limitations into account. 
 
  To sum up, Klamer presents somewhat of a caricature of economics, and it is, of 
course,  not  too  surprising  that  such  a  caricature  is  found  wanting.  Klamer’s 
perspective is limited to the supply side and, hence, is one-sided. As I will show in the 
next Section, when I discuss Klamer’s examples, the “demand side” of economics 
offers a perspective on the arts that is illuminating. 
 
 
4.  KLAMER’S EXAMPLES 
 
In this Section, I argue that the examples that Klamer gives to demonstrate that the 
economic  perspective  is  wanting  are  completely  unconvincing:  they  qualify  as 
examples only since the economic perspective is misrepresented. 
   8
1.  The contrast between the culturalist and economic perspectives 
The “contrast” that is described under this heading is simply the result of a basic 
fallacy. Of course, it is simply not true that an economist identifies “value” with 
“price”. Even in the simplest economic setting, it is only for the marginal consumer 
that value coincides with the price that is paid, while all infra-marginal consumers 
obtain positive surplus. The fact that our accounts make use of prices does not imply 
that economists would not recognize consumer surplus. In fact, the “heaven and hell 
‘paradox’”  illustrates  that  consumer  surplus  (and  welfare)  is  highest  where  gross 
national  product  is  smallest:  if  everything  is  abundant  and  there  is  no  scarcity 
whatsoever, prices are zero and value added through production is zero as well. Van 
der Ploeg discusses this issue and the different concepts of value in more detail. There 
is no need for me to further discuss this point. 
 
2.  Consumption of cultural goods is not really consumption 
Klamer writes “it is unclear what people consume when they visit a museum”. The 
remark applies not only to museums, but also to other “experiences” and becomes 
more relevant in the new economy in which consumption of virtual goods becomes 
more important (see Van Damme and Dellaert, 2001), but this does not imply that 
economics would not take this into account. Similarly, the remarks that tastes are 
acquired and that one has to learn to appreciate art are not peculiar to the cultural 
sector. The Dutch saying “wat de boer niet kent, dat eet hij niet” refers, in the first 
instance, to ordinary consumption. At the formal level, satisfaction depends on what 
arguments are in the utility function, and nothing tells us that this can be consumables 
only.  Indeed,  the  work  of  Akerlof  shows  quite  clearly  that  taking  a  broader 
perspective  can  yield  important  insights,  see  for  example,  Akerlof  (1997).  The 
“acquired tastes” argument alerts us to the fact that the utility function may depend on 
certain parameters and that these parameters may depend on previous consumption 
levels,  but  such  modelling  (of  “rational  addiction”)  is  also  bread  and  butter  for 
modern economists, see Becker (1993). 
 
3.  Consumption is more than consuming products and experiences 
Again this is somewhat of a triviality. Klamer’s examples under this heading boil 
down  to  an  individual’s  utility  of  consumption  depending  on  how  many  other 
individuals are consuming the same product, hence, there are network externalities in   9
consumption. Such externalities may be positive, as when I benefit more from reading 
Harry Potter the more others do so, or negative, as with snob goods. We have plenty 
of formal models that incorporate such consumption externalities and these have, I 
claim, increased our understanding of the phenomenon. 
 
4.  The values of cultural goods are more than economics can account for 
Under this heading, Klamer raises the question “What do Venice, New York and 
Amsterdam have that Arnhem and Manchester do not?” Part of the answer is given in 
Rick van der Ploeg’s presentation, where it comes under the heading of option value 
for non-reproducible products. Another part of the answer comes from the fact that 
these unique selling points then act as natural focal points for people to meet. We 
humans have a basic desire to meet other likeminded individuals, provided that it does 
not get too crowded. Hence, again consumption externalities are involved. This all is 
not  very  much  different  from  such  banal  things  as  “frequencies  for  radio 
broadcasting”. What is the value of “100.7 FM”? The term “100.7 FM” stands for 
more than an abstract frequency, it is also a meeting point where music listeners with 
a certain profile meet advertisers that are exactly interested in listeners having this 
profile. The economics of “Sky Radio” does not need to be much different from the 
economics of “Venice”. 
 
5.  Organisations may be worth more than what their balance sheet shows 
This point is accepted, but it is hard to imagine an economist who claimed that the 
worth of an  organisation is what is on the balance sheet. In fact, given the large 
diversity in value concepts (as discussed more extensively by Van der Ploeg), what is 
on the balance sheet is simply a convention. The market value of a company is the 
product of the number of shares and the price of a share, but it is hard to identify this 
with the value of that firm. The remarks that were made under point 1 above also 
apply here: at the current stock market price, there are as many traders that think the 
company is overvalued as there are that think it is undervalued. 
 
6.  A good life must consist of more than the pursuit of economic wealth 
We can be brief here. Certainly, most economists would agree that life is not about 
getting rich, but about other things. Of course, if somebody would view getting rich as   10
the goal in life, economists would have no difficulty of analysing the consequences of 
these preferences either. 
 
7.  The  important  values  seem  to  come  outside  the  sphere  of  economic 
calculation and exchange 
Here again, it makes sense to distinguish between the (traditional) economic domain 
(“exchange through the market”) and the economic method. There is a lot of exchange 
outside the formal  market and while such exchange is not  governed  by the price 
mechanism, this does not imply that it cannot be sensibly analysed by means of the 
economic method. Becker’s  analysis  of  the  “marriage  market”  is  a  case  in  point. 
Perhaps, love is governed by rational calculation, but this does not imply that the 
assumption  of  economic  calculation  cannot  yield  important  insights.  While  the 
economic approach may not enable us to predict which marriages will survive and 
which ones will fail, it may be relatively successful in predicting aggregate outcomes 
of  changes  in  external circumstances,  such  as better  outside  job  opportunities  for 
females. For a good illustration, see Fernández et al. (2001). 
 
8.  So many goods are shared 
It is no doubt true that many goods, such as friendship, love and information, are 
shared.  What  has  not  become  clear  to  me  from  Klamer’s  paper  is  why  this  is  a 
problem. For sure, from the work of Ronald Coase we know that a clear specification 
of property rights is extremely important for a certain type of goods, but it does not 
follow why property rights should be important for all types of goods. Why care about 
who owns a conversation? In Klamer’s paper, there is an obsession with property. It 
has not become clear to me why the issue merits that much attention. 
 
9.  Non-economic goods contribute to economic performance 
We can accept this fact, although we should also acknowledge that the relationship 
need not only be positive: trust may contribute to cartelisation and difference in trust 
between insiders and outsiders may induce insiders to pre-empty entry from outside, 
see Casson’s contribution to this workshop. The point I wish to make here, however, 
is  that  this  relation  between  economic  and  non-economic  variables  constitutes  an 
important and very active research area within economics at the moment, see, for   11
example, Glaeser et al. (1999, 2000). Hence, the claim that the economic perspective 
does not take these aspects into account cannot be maintained. 
 
10.  The ends cannot be economic in kind 
We already discussed this point in the previous Section and there is no need to repeat 
the  arguments  here.  Perhaps  one  point  may  be  added.  Klamer’s  claim  about  the 
“economisation” of public discourse seems justified. In the Netherlands, for example, 
the accountability operation “van beleidsvoorbereiding naar beleidsverantwoording” 
is in full swing. Aim of this bvtb-operation is to be more explicit about the goals of 
government policy such as to enable better ex post verification of the extent to which 
the goals have been met. Of course, the idea underlying this operation is that more 
transparency will ultimately lead to better policy making. Hence, while there is no 
exclusive focus on economic goals, there certainly is a move towards being more 
transparent and explicit, and this may lead to more “quantification” as well. It is hard 
to see how being more explicit about goals and being more transparent about the 
relation  between  means  and  ends  could  lead  to  worse  policy  making  and  worse 
outcomes. Whenever possible, “quantification” need not be bad. For example, putting 




5.  KLAMER ON UTILITY AND CAPITAL 
 
  In the previous section, I have argued that, in contrast to what Klamer claims, 
the economic perspective can enhance our understanding of the world of arts and 
culture. At the same time, it will have become clear that the perspective that I have 
sketched is different of Klamer’s: whereas Klamer focuses on technology, possessions 
and  constraints,  I  have  stressed  utility  functions  and  the  individual  preferences 
underlying  these.  Given  that  it  is  so  natural  to  start  with  these  demand  side 
characteristics, reading Klamer’s paper I was left wondering why he goes to such 
great pains to avoid the concept of utility. 
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  Klamer does not succeed in avoiding the concept completely, he discusses it a 
couple of times on the pages 8 and 9 of his paper. I must admit that the discussion 
there has left me confused. The discussion starts with 
 
  “Mainstream economists are satisfied with utility as the end: we possess a 
cd player or a painting because its enjoyment adds to our total utility”, 
 
which is fine. Clearly, utility will not be derived only from such physical things like 
cd  players  and  paintings,  but  also  from  immaterial  goods  such  as  music,  a 
conversation, a friendship, etc., hence, the need for a broad concept of utility. As 
already  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  we  may  even  need  to  incorporate 
consumption externalities. Having said this, Klamer, however, goes on to assert that  
 
  “This extension of goods to include values will meet resistance with the 
majority of economists, satisfied as they are with the notion of preference 
and utility”, 
 
a factual statement that I believe to be incorrect. To be specific, if the statement is that 
the majority of the economists would be willing to accept only utility functions with 
certain specified arguments, then I believe it to be false. Up to now, economists have 
never inquired in great detail into the nature of the utility function, hence, they simply 
do not have the information to judge which arguments would be relevant and which 
ones not. Indeed it is very much the opposite, as Klamer writes in the next sentence 
 
  “The notion of utility is without content ... Any utility will do.” 
 
  From the discussion that follows in his paper, I infer that Klamer views this as a 
major drawback of the economic approach. I, in contrast, tend to view this as a great 
selling point. For sure, I agree with Klamer that there is a need to go beyond the 
vacuous notion of utility, but the fact that the basic concept is vacuous implies that the 
economic method is unbiased and versatile, hence, in particular, that there is nothing 
that stands in the way of applying it to the cultural sector. 
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  Of course, there is the important philosophical problem of how a theory without 
content can be empirical relevant. If any utility will do, how to guard against ad hoc 
theorizing? Here I can do little more than quote Gary Becker 
 
  “A close relation between theory and empirical testing helps prevent both 
the theoretical analysis and the empirical research from becoming sterile. 
Empirically oriented theories encourage the development of new sources 
and types of data ... puzzling empirical results force changes in theory.” 
(Becker (1993), p. 403) 
 
  In other words, existing work may point to the relevance of a certain type of 
utility function in a certain domain and we may be content with working with such a 
function as long as we are not too far from that domain and the data do not force us to 
do differently. At the same time, when entering new territory, we may experiment 
with alternative utility functions and temporarily settle upon the one that yields actual 
insight into that situation. Given the check of the data, I don’t see a reason to be afraid 
of the utility framework. The work of Ernst Fehr and his colleagues on “social utility” 
that I already referred to above shows the fruitfulness of this approach. 
 
  Of course, the above does not imply that we need be satisfied with existing 
theory. In particular, the idea that the utility function is fixed and given, while perhaps 
appropriate for a mature consumer acting in the traditional economic domain, need 
not be appropriate in other domains. Indeed, in the domain of the arts, it seems that 
we should leave room for “acquiring tastes” and for the government acting as an agent 
for future generations since current generations need not necessarily fully internalise 
the preferences of their children. In this respect, Klamer’s suggestion to distinguish 
between various types of capital is worthwhile, and it may very well be integrated into 
the standard (utility) theory. 
 
  Klamer proposes to distinguish between three types of capital: economic, social 
and cultural. He defines economic capital as the capacity to generate economic wealth 
and, in essence, it is an individualistic concept. The other two forms of capital can, 
according to Klamer, be possessed by both individuals and organisations, but I will 
restrict  myself  to  the  individual  component.  Social capital  then  is  the capacity  to   14
generate social values (like friendship and trust) and cultural capital is the capacity to 
inspire and to be inspired. Even though we can agree with Klamer that measurement 
may  be  extremely  difficult,  economists  will  probably  be  able  to  recognize  the 
different types and the trade-offs involved in investing in these different types. 
 
  For example, in the interaction between parent and child, the kid may argue that 
the best use of her time is to visit a friend or to be on the phone, while the parent may 
state that it would be better to first do the homework. In essence, this can be seen as a 
choice between investment in social capital (the kid’s position) and economic capital 
(the parent’s position). Similarly, a teacher preparing his classes the night before has 
to decide whether to make an investment in social capital (spending the evening with 
his family or at the sports club) or in cultural capital (if he better prepares his lectures, 
he will be more inspiring and will be more admired by the students in class). 
 
  One  can,  more  generally,  imagine  that  the  utility  function  of  an  individual 
depends on several state variables, including the current stocks of various types of 
capital. An individual who only invests in economic capital may run down his other 
capital stocks and, after having done that, may attach only low marginal utility to 
cultural goods. Formally, the situation resembles that of the rational addiction model, 
with one important exception: while the externalities involved in an individual not 
making a rational smoking decision may not be too large, the externalities in the 
cultural  domain  can  certainly  not  be  neglected.  If  we  destroy  unique,  non-
reproducible, objects of art, or if we destroy our own taste for high culture, we also 




6.  CONCLUSION 
 
  In economics one learns to think about the tension between what one has and 
what one wants. Klamer argues that since we do not account for all that we have, we 
actually loose sight of what we want. As he writes on page 14 of his paper 
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  “By following Hicks ... we lost sight of the activities that contribute to the 
good life and the good society.” 
 
  Klamer’s solution is to follow Hicks even more, specifically, he proposes to also 
measure  the  values  in  the  social  and  cultural  domain.  In  this  discussion  I  have 
expressed  my  reservations  about  following  this  proposal.  I  have  pointed  to  the 
difficulty  of  measuring  these  values  and  of  the  risks  involved  in  imperfect 
measurement: a policy that chases these proxy goals may miss the real ends and, 
hence, may fail. More importantly, I have expressed the fear that the notions of capital 
that Klamer wishes to introduce in the social and cultural domain may be foreign to 
the non-economists that work in, and lobby for the important values of these sectors 
and, hence, that these lobbies may become less effective when Klamer’s proposal is 
followed.  In  short,  Klamer’s  proposal  may  be  viewed  as  an  act  of  “economic 
imperialism” that may receive hostile response from culturalists. 
 
  Most importantly, I have argued that there is an alternative route available to not 
loose sight of the social and cultural values. This route consists in not following Hicks 
at all, but rather Robbins. The suggestion, hence, is to focus on scarcity and on our 
wants directly. I have argued that the economic approach is sufficiently flexible so 
that it can actually incorporate the arguments of the culturalists and provide a firm 
foundation for at least some of these. I would consider the contributions of Van der 
Ploeg, Frey and Casson in this Symposium to provide good examples of how the 
economic perspective actually strengthens the culturalist perspective. The “contrast” 
between these two perspectives is not a real contrast, it is just a perceived one, and it 
should be possible to eliminate it by rational informed discussion. 
   16
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